

## AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS ALLIANCE SUBMISSION

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To: The Australian Energy Regulator  
Re: Network Resilience Guidelines

10 July 2026



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## 1. AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS ALLIANCE

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The Australian Telecommunications Alliance (ATA) is the peak body of the Australian telecommunications industry. We are the trusted voice at the intersection of industry, government, regulators, and consumers. Through collaboration and leadership, we shape initiatives that grow the Australian telecommunications industry, enhance connectivity for all Australians, and foster the highest standards of business behaviour. For more details, visit [www.austelco.org.au](http://www.austelco.org.au).

For questions on this submission, please contact Victoria Robertson, Head of Government Relations and Policy, at [v.robertson@austelco.org.au](mailto:v.robertson@austelco.org.au).

## 2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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The Australian Telecommunications Alliance (ATA) welcomes the opportunity to provide this submission in response to the Australian Energy Regulator's (AER) public consultation paper on its *Network Resilience Guidelines*.

The consultation paper appropriately recognises that resilient electricity networks support community resilience and that multiple entities have a role to play in disaster preparedness, response and recovery. It considers the extent to which expenditure efficiently reduces the risk and impact on consumers of power outages caused by severe weather events. However, the ATA suggests the proposed framework could more explicitly recognise the interdependencies between electricity distribution networks and telecommunications infrastructure.

In this submission, references to telecommunications infrastructure includes critical assets such as, but not limited to:

- Mobile network exchanges and base stations (e.g. mobile towers, rooftop facilities)
- Major backhaul nodes
- Regional aggregation hubs
- NBN Points of Interconnect
- Emergency service communications facilities
- Triple Zero supporting infrastructure

Telecommunications resilience is a relevant consideration because it directly affects the impact experienced by electricity consumers during and after severe weather events. The practical impact of an electricity outage is materially increased where telecommunications services are also unavailable, limiting access to emergency information, emergency services, banking, health services and recovery assistance. These consumer and community impacts make it clear that the resilience of one sector can no longer be evaluated independently from the resilience of the other.

The main themes in the submission are:

- The strategic interdependency between telecommunications and electricity distribution networks.
- Expanding assessments of network resilience expenditure to recognise co-dependent critical infrastructure and essential services, like telecommunications infrastructure.
- Recognising resilience investments that protect, restore or enhance telecommunications connectivity as legitimate resilience outcomes because, in the lived experience of Australians, electricity and telecommunications networks are an interconnected critical infrastructure system explicitly relied upon during emergencies and natural disasters.

### 3. INTERDEPENDENCY OF THE ELECTRICITY AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTORS

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The telecommunications sector is no longer simply another customer of electricity networks. The two sectors should be considered interdependent critical infrastructure systems.

- Telecommunications networks require continuous electricity supply to operate mobile towers, exchanges, data centres and backhaul infrastructure.
- Electricity networks increasingly rely on telecommunications systems for network monitoring, outage management, distributed energy resource coordination, field work dispatch, and restoration activities.

As climate-related hazards become more frequent and severe, the risk of cascading failures across these sectors is increasing.<sup>1</sup> A disruption to electricity supply can rapidly degrade telecommunications capability, while telecommunications outages can impair the ability of energy providers to monitor networks, coordinate crews and restore power. This also demonstrates how consumers experience the consequences of outages holistically rather than by infrastructure sector, or asset.

Electricity disruptions are a significant contributor to telecommunications outages, particularly in regional and remote communities where restoration time may be extended and network redundancy is limited.<sup>2</sup> Evidence from the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) indicates that electricity supply disruptions are a primary driver of telecommunications outages during natural disasters. In its review of the 2019-20 bushfires, the ACMA found that 779 of 888 telecommunications outages (88%) resulted from mains power failures.<sup>3</sup>

This highlights the critical dependency of telecommunications infrastructure on electricity networks and reinforces the need for coordinated resilience planning across both sectors. While many sites have batteries or back-up power generation, these solutions are generally time-limited and become increasingly vulnerable during prolonged power outages associated with major bushfires, floods, cyclones and severe storms.

In addition to the National Climate Risk Assessment findings, recent work through the Telecommunications Resilience Investment Pilot (TRIP) project, the Commonwealth-led Energy-Communications Resilience Forum (ECRF), and the NSW-led Joint Telecommunications and Power Resilience Forum also identifies the interdependency of the two sectors demonstrating that resilience investment should no longer be considered on a sector-by-sector basis. Instead, the resilience of telecommunications and electricity networks should be treated as a shared national infrastructure challenge.

The TRIP project concluded that many resilience challenges in the telecommunications sector cannot be solved by telecommunications investment alone<sup>4</sup>, and the ATA suggests this conclusion would also be true for the electricity sector. In particular, the TRIP project noted:

- market incentives by themselves are unlikely to deliver the required investment,
- current funding programs do not adequately support cross-sector resilience initiatives, and
- resilience outcomes are strongly influenced by the level of coordination between critical infrastructure sectors.

<sup>1</sup> [National Climate Risk Assessment Overview Report](#) (referred to herein as NCRA Overview Report) (2025), Executive Summary – “Changing Hazards” and “Risks to our way of life”, pp. ii-iv and the [Infrastructure and Built Environment System Assessment – Future Risk Assessment](#) both produced by the Australian Climate Service.

<sup>2</sup> The “Risks to places” section in the [NCRA Overview Report](#) notes remote communities are vulnerable due to limitations in power and telecommunications supply. The “Vulnerabilities” section of the [Infrastructure and Built Environment System Assessment](#) notes the limited redundancy in critical systems, with vulnerabilities highlighted in coastal and remote locations.

<sup>3</sup> Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) (2020), *Impacts of the 2019-20 Bushfires on the Telecommunications Network* available at <https://www.acma.gov.au/publications/2020-04/report/impacts-2019-20-bushfires-telecommunications-network>

<sup>4</sup> CSIRO, *Strengthening Mobile Telecommunications Resilience for a Changing Climate: Telecommunications Resilience Investment Pilot (TRIP) Project Brief*, Enabling Resilience Investment Program available at <https://research.csiro.au/enabling-resilience-investment/wp-content/uploads/sites/435/2026/02/TRIP-project-brief.pdf>

Commonwealth, State and Territory governments have represented their community's concerns and sensitivity to telecommunications and electricity outages via the Energy and Climate Ministerial Council (ECMC). Chaired by the Commonwealth Minister for Climate Change and Energy, the Hon Chris Bowen MP, and comprising the equivalent portfolio ministers from the jurisdictions, the matter of telecommunications and electricity resilience has been discussed regularly in this forum since August 2025. The Commonwealth Minister for Communications, the Hon Anika Wells MP, has also participated in these discussions.

An action from the ECMC, agreed by the Commonwealth ministers, resulted in the Department of Climate Change, Energy, Environment and Water (DCCEEW) and the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications, Sport and the Arts (DITRDCSA) establishing an Electricity-Communications Resilience Forum (ECRF). Initial engagement with the ECRF provided opportunity for select industry members from each sector to identify issues and propose actions to mitigate the causes, duration and impacts of outages. The Commonwealth released a subsequent work plan to ECRF members following this engagement focusing on actions it would lead to improve resilience of the two sectors, such as increased information sharing, and prioritised restoration of telecommunications services.

Alongside the ECRF, the ATA and some of its Members including NBN Co, Telstra, Optus and TPG Telecom, participate in the NSW Joint Telecommunications and Power Resilience Forum Steering Committee and its two working groups – Planning for Resilience, and Preparation for Response. This Committee is led by the NSW Reconstruction Authority and industry action to address interdependent resilience issues (also identified in the ECRF) are already underway.

Noting the broader environment that this consultation process is occurring within, it is timely that the *Network Resilience Guidelines* to be updated to reflect findings from recent reports such as the National Climate Risk Assessment and the TRIP Project that highlight the interdependencies of the electricity and telecommunications sectors.

## 4. RESPONSE TO THE CONSULTATION

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The ATA provides a general response to the questions posed in the Consultation Paper under the following themes:

- Expanding the definition of network resilience
- Supporting information for resilience expenditure proposals
- Expanding the definition of community resilience
- Distribution Annual Planning Reports (DAPR)
- Resilience expenditure and incentive schemes

### 4.1 EXPANDING THE DEFINITION OF NETWORK RESILIENCE

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4.1.1 This section responds to Question 1.

4.1.2 The ATA would support broadening the practical application of the AER's proposed definition of network resilience to explicitly recognise critical infrastructure interdependencies.

4.1.3 While the current definition is appropriate, its interpretation should include the ability of electricity networks to maintain services that support dependent critical infrastructure systems. The definition could be updated to demonstrate this interpretation more explicitly. For example:

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*Network resilience includes the ability of the electricity network to support the continuity and restoration of dependent critical infrastructure services where those services are necessary for community safety, emergency response and recovery.*

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4.1.4 The ATA considers the updated definition:

- Is consistent with the *Network Resilience Guidelines* focus on reducing the risk and impact of severe weather events on consumers, and
- Acknowledges that consumers experience resilience outcomes through the continued operation of essential services, not the performance of individual critical infrastructure assets.

## 4.2 SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR RESILIENCE EXPENDITURE PROPOSALS

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4.2.1 This section responds to Questions 3 to 6.

4.2.2 Australia's National Climate Risk Assessment finds that climate hazards are becoming increasingly compounding and cascading, with disruptions in critical infrastructure expected to generate ripple effects across sectors, services and communities. The Assessment identifies both electricity and telecommunications infrastructure as highly exposed to climate hazards and notes that remote communities are particularly vulnerable because of limited power, telecommunications and supply-chain resilience.<sup>5</sup>

4.2.3 The ATA recommends the *Network Resilience Guidelines* encourage electricity network providers assessment of cascading impacts as part of any resilience expenditure proposal. From a telecommunications perspective, the types of cascading impacts that could be assessed include:

- Telecommunications infrastructure or assets that rely upon specific electricity supply feeders
- Critical communications sites that may be affected by proposed investments
- Mobile coverage areas at risk from power outages
- Effects on backhaul networks and critical communications node
- Impacts on emergency communications capabilities
- Consequences for restoration of other critical infrastructure services

4.2.4 There is a growing number of information sharing arrangements and agreements between individual service providers from each sector detailing information about operational and site location matters that would allow for this type of assessment to be undertaken by electricity network providers.

4.2.5 The ATA also recommends that a standardised resilience template, if introduced, should incorporate interdependency mapping to maximise the value of the assessment and inform broader understanding at the regulatory and cross-sectoral levels. For example, the following interdependencies with telecommunications could be mapped:

- The critical communications sites served
- Back-up power capability at dependent telecommunication infrastructure sites
- Restoration priority classifications
- Critical infrastructure co-benefits

<sup>5</sup> The [NCRA Overview Report](#) discusses compounding and cascading hazards having a ripple effect across sectors.

- Anticipated reduction in cascading outage risk

4.2.6 There is an opportunity to closely align the proposed standardised resilience template with the annual resilience reporting requirement for the Distribution Annual Planning Reports (DAPR). This would reduce the compliance burden on electricity network providers and, at the same time, ensure the two reporting requirements offer relevant, useful information to assess the performance of resilience outcomes over time.

### 4.3 EXPANDING THE DEFINITION OF COMMUNITY RESILIENCE

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4.3.1 This section responds to Questions 7 to 9.

4.3.2 The ATA considers the definition of community resilience in the consultation paper could further recognise the impact to overall community resilience when other services that inherently rely on power are also lost during a natural disaster or other emergency. For example:

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*Community resilience is the ability of communities to withstand and recover from the impact of natural disasters. It is fundamentally dependent on the coordinated performance of essential services and critical infrastructure on which communities rely, including electricity, telecommunications, water and emergency services.*

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4.3.3 The ATA considers telecommunications availability should be considered a core indicator of community resilience. This is because telecommunications services are essential infrastructure that underpin modern economic and social activity. The Australian Government notes the importance of connectivity in Australians' daily lives with ACMA research finding that 99.7% of adults have internet access, and 97% use mobile devices to access online services.<sup>6</sup> This means disruptions to telecommunications networks can affect access to emergency information, government services, healthcare, education, financial transactions and social connection, particularly in regional and remote communities. The Regional Telecommunications Review recognises that connectivity is increasingly integral to economic participation, access to essential services and community resilience in regional, rural and remote Australia.<sup>7</sup>

4.3.4 Given the evidence of community reliance on connectivity, investment by electricity network providers that supports continued telecommunications operation in disasters and other emergencies should be recognised as directly contributing to community resilience.

4.3.5 Examples where resilience investment could be directed include:

- The protection of feeders serving critical mobile and fixed sites
- Improved restoration arrangements for telecommunications infrastructure (e.g. prioritising restoration of telecommunications as a critical service, alongside other essential services including hospitals, water utilities, supermarkets and financial institutions).
- Provision of temporary electricity supply to critical telecommunication infrastructure, alongside telecommunications providers own efforts
- Network investments to help reduce outage duration at telecommunications sites

<sup>6</sup> ACMA, *Communications and Media in Australia* research program available at <https://www.acma.gov.au/communications-and-media-australia>

<sup>7</sup> Australian Government, *2024 Regional Telecommunications Review* available at <https://www.rtirc.gov.au/>

- Information sharing arrangements and systems that improve restoration coordination between energy and telecommunication providers.<sup>8</sup>

4.3.6 As discussed in section 3 above, there is significant collaboration and work underway between the two sectors to underpin justifications for resilience investment. The telecommunications sector invests heavily in the resilience of its networks, receiving some government funding in the way of grants such as the Mobile Network Hardening Program<sup>9</sup> and the Telecommunications Disaster Resilience Innovation program<sup>10</sup>. The ATA notes current reporting frameworks do not enable telecommunications resilience expenditure to be quantified consistently, which demonstrates the need for better recognition of resilience investments and cross-sector resilience benefits.<sup>11</sup>

#### 4.4 DISTRIBUTION ANNUAL PLANNING REPORTS (DAPR)

- 4.4.1 This section responds to Questions 10 and 11.
- 4.4.2 The consultation paper notes the Distribution Annual Planning Reports (DAPR) should improve transparency of resilience activities and performance. The ATA strongly supports this objective, and the opportunity it offers to include specific reporting on critical infrastructure interdependencies, as outlined in section 4.2 above.
- 4.4.3 The Energy-Communications Resilience Forum (ECRF) established as an outcome of the Energy and Climate Ministerial Council (ECMC) in 2025 identified two measures – information sharing and prioritisation of telecommunications – as critical areas requiring coordination between both the electricity and telecommunications providers.
- 4.4.4 The annual resilience reporting requirement in the DAPR provides an opportunity for the electricity providers to operationalise these recommendations by including information in annual reports about interdependency mapping and resilience and restoration planning, alongside performance reporting.
- 4.4.5 The reporting requirement also offers opportunity for coordinated resilience investment across critical infrastructure sectors. For example, visibility of planned resilience investment by the electricity sector means telecommunications providers are unlikely to duplicate investment and, instead, can spread resilience investment to other sites or locations as needed, ensuring broader uplift in resilience across the two sectors.
- 4.4.6 While individual telecommunications and electricity providers are establishing agreements and arrangements to share critical infrastructure information, further work is needed to recognise telecommunications as a critical service for prioritised restoration and connection alongside other essential services identified in State and Territory regulatory arrangements.
- 4.4.7 The ATA supports the development of nationally consistent prioritisation principles and encourages the AER to recognise telecommunications assets that support emergency communications and critical infrastructure as priority customers for resilience planning purposes. Clearly articulating the

<sup>8</sup> While sharing network and critical site information and data in advance of any natural disaster or emergency event that may cause outages is important, so too is recognising the importance of the close working relationships established by the network operations teams of each sector. These relationships are relied upon during events, on the ground, and in real time to coordinate activities for service restoration.

<sup>9</sup> The Mobile Network Hardening Program (MNHP) is an Australian Government initiative funding upgrades to improve the resilience of mobile network telecommunications infrastructure in regional and peri-urban parts of Australia. Further information about this program is available at <https://www.infrastructure.gov.au/media-communications/phone/mobile-network-hardening-program>

<sup>10</sup> The Telecommunications Disaster Resilience Innovation (TDRI) program promotes the development of new technologies to provide solutions and improvements for telecommunications resilience. Further information about this program and the types of resilience initiatives that have been funded is available at <https://www.infrastructure.gov.au/media-communications/phone/telecommunications-disaster-resilience-innovation-program>

<sup>11</sup> Australian National University Tech Policy Design Centre (2024) *Australian Telecommunications Sector Resilience Profile: Keeping Australia Connected in an Uncertain World* available at [https://techpolicy.au/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/ANU-ATSRP-Report\\_2024-Final.pdf](https://techpolicy.au/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/ANU-ATSRP-Report_2024-Final.pdf) and the CSIRO, *Telecommunications Resilience Investment Pilot (TRIP) Project* available at <https://research.csiro.au/enabling-resilience-investment/case-studies/resilience-in-mobile-telecommunications/>

interdependency between the two sectors in the DAPR could assist reaching the second measure identified by the ECMC.

#### 4.5 RESILIENCE EXPENDITURE AND INCENTIVE SCHEMES

- 4.5.1 This section responds to Question 12.
- 4.5.2 The consultation paper focuses appropriately on reducing the risk and impact of power outages on consumers. However, the ATA submits that the current incentive framework does not fully recognise resilience investments that deliver benefits across multiple critical infrastructure sectors.
- 4.5.3 While the existing regulatory framework appropriately promotes efficient electricity network outcomes, it may undervalue investments that materially improve the resilience of dependent infrastructure such as telecommunications networks.
- 4.5.4 Consideration of telecommunications impacts is entirely consistent with the new resilience expenditure factors because continuity of telecommunications service materially influences the extent of impact experienced by consumers during prolonged electricity outages.
- 4.5.5 The National Climate Risk Assessment highlights that climate-related disruptions to critical infrastructure, including electricity and telecommunications networks, can generate cascading impacts across sectors, with significant consequences for communications, businesses and regional economies.<sup>12</sup> During a major disaster, communities experience the combined consequences of losing electricity, telecommunications, emergency communications, banking and payment services, health services, and transport and logistics systems.
- 4.5.6 Under the current framework, many of the broader, downstream benefits provided by service continuity are not quantified or receive limited recognition in expenditure assessments because they occur outside the electricity network boundary. The following examples highlight where electricity network providers can face difficulty in demonstrating the full value of the investment under the existing incentive frameworks.

##### **Example 1: Hardening a feeder service to a major mobile exchange**

*A resilience investment that protects a telecommunications exchange serving 50,000 customers may produce significantly greater net benefits than are reflected by electricity customer numbers directly connected to the relevant feeder.*

*The wider social value of sustaining those communications services is unlikely to be fully reflected in traditional electricity network investment assessments.*

- 4.5.7 Assessment frameworks that do not capture cross-sector benefits risk understating the true economic value of resilience investments.

<sup>12</sup> The NCRA Overview Report available at <https://www.acs.gov.au/pages/national-climate-risk-assessment>

### **Example 2: Priority restoration arrangements**

*Investment in network automation or restoration capability that serves telecommunications hubs may result in:*

- faster restoration of mobile services
- improved emergency communications
- improved public warning capability, and
- reduced community disruption.

*These benefits are realised outside normal electricity reliability metrics, despite delivering substantial public value.*

- 4.5.8 The ATA recommends the AER provide explicit guidance that resilience expenditure proposals may include evidence of avoided telecommunications outages, improved emergency communications capability, reduced cascading infrastructure failures and broader community resilience outcomes where those benefits arise directly from the proposed expenditure.
- 4.5.9 This would also support future co-investment opportunities between electricity networks, telecommunications provider and governments where systemic resilience benefits are delivered.
- 4.5.10 This approach better reflects the interconnected nature of modern critical infrastructure systems and supports efficient investment that delivers the greatest overall benefit to consumers and communities. This approach also aligns with:
- The National Climate Risk Assessment findings on cascading infrastructure risks
  - The TRIP project's conclusions regarding infrastructure interdependencies and resilience investment
  - Outcomes from the Commonwealth-led Energy-Communications Resilience Forum (ECRF), and
  - The AER's stated objective of improving resilience outcomes for consumers and communities.

## **5. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS**

The resilience of electricity and telecommunications networks is increasingly inseparable. Future resilience frameworks should move beyond asset-based assessments and recognise that consumers ultimately depend upon the combined performance of interconnected critical infrastructure systems. Explicit recognition of telecommunications-electricity interdependency within the *Network Resilience Guidelines* would improve investment decisions, support efficient resilience expenditure and deliver better outcomes for Australian communities facing increasing climate-related risks.

### **5.1 RECOMMENDATION 1: RECOGNISE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE INTERDEPENDENCIES**

- 5.1.1 The *Network Resilience Guidelines* should explicitly recognise that electricity and telecommunications networks are interdependent critical infrastructure systems whose resilience outcomes are increasingly interconnected.

### **5.2 RECOMMENDATION 2: EXPAND THE DEFINITION OF NETWORK RESILIENCE**

- 5.2.1 The AER should clarify that network resilience includes support for dependent critical infrastructure services where those services materially contribute to community safety, emergency response and disaster recovery.

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### 5.3 RECOMMENDATION 3: REQUIRE ASSESSMENT OF CASCADING INFRASTRUCTURE IMPACTS

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- 5.3.1 The *Network Resilience Guidelines* should encourage electricity network providers to identify and assess the impacts of outages on dependent critical infrastructure, including telecommunications networks, when developing resilience expenditure proposals.

### 5.4 RECOMMENDATION 4: INCORPORATE INTERDEPENDENCY MAPPING INTO RESILIENCE REPORTING

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- 5.4.1 Any standardised resilience template and DAPR reporting requirements should include:
- Critical telecommunications dependencies
  - Restoration priorities
  - Priorities for new connections of critical infrastructure to the electricity network
  - Resilience co-benefits
  - Cascading risk assessments
  - Cross-sector restoration arrangements

### 5.5 RECOMMENDATION 5: RECOGNISE TELECOMMUNICATIONS AS A CONTRIBUTOR TO COMMUNITY RESILIENCE

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- 5.5.1 The AER's definition of community resilience should reflect how the loss of other services during an electricity outage, such as telecommunications connectivity, can affect overall community resilience.
- 5.5.2 The *Network Resilience Guidelines* should recognise telecommunications availability as a key contributor to community resilience and support resilience investments that maintain communications capability during natural disasters and prolonged outages.

### 5.6 RECOMMENDATION 6: SUPPORT INFORMATION SHARING AND JOINT RESILIENCE PLANNING

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- 5.6.1 The AER should encourage electricity network providers to demonstrate how resilience investments support information sharing, restoration coordination and resilience planning with telecommunications providers and other critical infrastructure operators.

### 5.7 RECOMMENDATION 7: RECOGNISE CROSS-SECTOR BENEFITS IN RESILIENCE EXPENDITURE ASSESSMENTS

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- 5.7.1 The AER should provide guidance allowing resilience expenditure proposals to incorporate the following evidence where those outcomes arise directly from the proposed investment:
- Avoided telecommunications outages
  - Improved emergency communications
  - Reduced cascading failures
  - Faster connection and restoration of critical services
  - Broader community resilience benefits

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## 5.8 RECOMMENDATION 8: REFLECT CROSS-SECTOR BENEFITS IN INCENTIVE FRAMEWORKS

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- 5.8.1 The AER should consider how the CESS, EBSS and STPIS frameworks can better recognise resilience investments that deliver benefits across multiple critical infrastructure sectors rather than solely within the electricity network boundary.

## 5.9 RECOMMENDATION 9: ENCOURAGE CO-INVESTMENT AND WHOLE-OF-SYSTEM RESILIENCE APPROACHES

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- 5.9.1 The *Network Resilience Guidelines* should recognise the value of resilience investments that produce benefits across multiple sectors and support future opportunities for coordinated investment between electricity networks, telecommunications providers and governments.

## 5.10 RECOMMENDATION 10: ADOPT A WHOLE-OF-SYSTEM APPROACH TO RESILIENCE

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- 5.10.1 The *Network Resilience Guidelines* should promote a whole-of-system approach to resilience that recognises consumers ultimately depend on the combined performance of interconnected critical infrastructure systems rather than the performance of individual sectors in isolation.

Given the critical nature of the electricity and telecommunications sectors for Australian communities, it is important that future initiatives with impact on the interdependency of the two sectors remains informed by an ongoing and constructive dialogue with the telecommunications sector, facilitated by the ATA.

The ATA and its members stand ready to work with the Government, regulators, and other relevant stakeholders to ensure the resilience of the electricity and telecommunications networks can withstand and respond to the causes, duration and impacts of outages.

Ends

